This is an Accepted Manuscript of a book chapter, which appeared in the volume "Communicating populism. Comparing interactions between politicians, media, and citizens across Europe" published by Routledge in April 2019 and edited by Carsten Reinemann, James Stanyer, Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser, & Claes de Vreese.

The book is available online at: https://www.routledge.com/Communicating-Populism-Comparing-Actor-Perceptions-Media-Coverage-and/Reinemann-Stanyer-Aalberg-Esser-de-Vreese/p/book/9781138392724

The upload of this chapter is in accordance with the Green Open Access policy of Routledge. For more info see: https://www.routledge.com/info/open_access/by_the_chapter

5 Dimensions, Speakers, and Targets

Basic Patterns in European Media Reporting on Populism

Sina Blassnig, Patricia Rodi, Keren Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Kinga Adamczewska, Lilia Raycheva, Sven Engesser and Frank Esser

Introduction

European media systems have been affected by major changes in the last few decades that have facilitated the dissemination of populist messages, including increased media ownership concentration, increased commercialization, and a stronger orientation towards news values (Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017). At the same time, Europe has faced several political crises, such as the European sovereign debt crisis, the refugee crisis, and 'Brexit'. Against this background, we analyze populist communication in immigration news coverage as well as in opinion pieces within two time periods (2016 & 2017) across twelve European countries. We define populism as a 'thin' ideology (Mudde, 2004) and derive four dimensions of populist communication: people-centrism, anti-elitism, the exclusion of specific out-groups, and restoring sovereignty (Mény & Surel, 2002; Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017). This chapter provides a theoretical introduction to populist communication in the media, and a detailed description of the methodological approach, as well as first descriptive results of the study.

Theoretical Background

Populist Ideology and Populist Communication

Building on Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, and de Vreese (2017), we define populism as a 'thin' ideology (Mudde, 2004) and follow a "communication-centered approach" to studying populist political communication (Stanyer, Salgado, & Strömbäck, 2017, p. 354). Thus, we focus on the *content* of populist communication and determine the *degree of populism* in the media by how frequently political actors, journalists, or other actors communicate populist key messages (de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & Stanyer, 2018; Engesser, Fawzi, & Larsson, 2017; Reinemann et al., 2017).

Following on from the three dimensions (people-centrism, anti-elitism, and the exclusion of 'others') discussed in the introduction of this volume, we consider an additional dimension in the framework – restoring sovereignty. This is consistent with the idea that "populism tries to give power back to the people and restore popular sovereignty. Populists believe that politics should be based on the immediate expression of the general will of the people" (Abts & Rummens, 2007, p. 408; see also Canovan, 2002; Mény & Surel, 2002; Mudde, 2004). As

such, we regard the emphasis on the struggle over sovereignty as a distinct component of populism.

Populist key messages that can be assigned to these four dimensions focus on three target groups. The first is ‘the people’, who are regarded as pure and good and whose empowerment and sovereignty is demanded. Thus, ‘the people’ is mainly the target of positive, advocative populist key messages. Furthermore, ‘the people’ are conceived as a homogenous entity whose common interests, desires, and will, need to be vindicated against adversaries who do not belong to ‘the people’. The first of these out-groups, and thus the second target group, is ‘the elite’, which is perceived as corrupt, inept, out of touch with the people, and denied sovereignty. ‘The elite’, which can be the political, economic, juridical, media, scientific, or cultural elite, is target of a vertical differentiation from ‘the people’ and, hence, of negative, conflictive populist key messages. The third target group are ‘the others’, conceived as specific social groups who do not share the people’s “good” characteristics, values, or opinions (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 3). These out-groups are specific segments of the population who do not comply with the monolithic conception of ‘the people’ and are juxtaposed to the people in terms of needs, origin, ethnicity, citizenship, political rights, etc. Thus, they are subject to a horizontal differentiation or even a “downward-oriented social comparison”, since ‘the others’ are often seen as inferior to ‘the people’ (Reinemann et al., 2017, p. 21). ‘The people’, ‘the elite’, and ‘the others’ can all be conceptualized in different ways, for example in political, economic, or cultural terms. Whether ‘the people’ is defined as, for example, ‘sovereign’, ‘class’, ‘nation’, ‘ethnic group’, also implies who does not belong to ‘the people’ (Reinemann et al., 2017). Consequently, the conceptions of ‘the elite’ and ‘the others’ in populist key messages are expected to be closely related to the notion of ‘the people’.

Figure 5.1 summarizes the relationships between the four dimensions and three target groups of populist communication. Although there is some disagreement about how the different dimensions of populist communication relate to one another and which elements are necessary or sufficient to speak of populism, we argue, in accordance with the conceptualisation set out at the outset, that *complete* populist ideology (see also Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) should entail all four dimensions. However, earlier research has shown that populist ideology is often communicated in a fragmented way, especially in the media (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016). The individual dimensions are likely to be found empirically in different combinations or in varying degrees, indicating different types of populist communication (Reinemann et al., 2017). Thus, we consider populist communication as a combination of these four dimensions which complement, imply, or even evoke each other (Müller et al., 2017) and empirically manifest in different types of populist communication.

In this chapter, we focus on these four dimensions and three target groups of populist key messages, and thus on the *content* of populist communication. However, as other authors elaborate (de Vreese et al., 2018; Engesser et al., 2017; Wirth et al., 2016), populist ideology or the *content* of populist communication (*what?*) may be supplemented by populist style, which refers to the *form* of populist communication (*how?*). Unlike the ideological or content-related components of populist communication, there is still little consensus on how to define

or operationalize populist style. Nevertheless, efforts to systematize populist style elements emphasize the dimensions of negativity, emotionalization, simplification, and sociability (Engesser et al., 2017, see also Maurer et al. in this volume).



Figure 5.1 Key concepts and messages of populist communication

Populism in the Media

While classical research literature on political populism (see, e.g., Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2000) does not mention the media at all, more recent studies have increasingly emphasized the role of the media in the dissemination of populist messages (see, e.g., Engesser et al., 2017; Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017; Müller et al., 2017). From a political communication perspective, the role of the media is crucial to understanding the ubiquity of populist messages, as well as the rise and success of recent populist political actors (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017).

With regard to populism in editorial content, Esser, Stępińska, and Hopmann (2017) distinguish between populism *by* the media and populism *through* the media. Rather simplified, these two perspectives differentiate whether the communicators of populist messages are the media themselves, political actors, or other actors whose messages are disseminated through the media. The first perspective, *populism by the media*, refers to a media populism that is actively propagated by media organizations or journalists (Esser et al., 2017). Thus, the media may themselves appeal to the people and construct in and out-groups, or promote anti-elitism (Mazzoleni, 2014). This is similar to Krämer's (2014) notion of media populism. The cause can be either a specific journalistic ideology, or an increasing commercialization of the media. The second perspective, *populism through the media*, focuses on the media's provision of a platform for populists, which facilitates the distribution and amplification of populist messages originating from politicians and other actors. This is closely connected to the idea of a – generally unintentional – convergence of goals between the "production logic" of commercialized media,

and that of populist political actors (Esser et al., 2017, p. 369; Mazzoleni, 2008, pp. 54–55). According to this perspective, media logic and news values create a favorable opportunity structure to populist messages that may, in turn, be anticipated and exploited by populist actors (Esser et al., 2017). Thus, intentionally or unintentionally, the media can provide a conducive stage for populism (Mazzoleni, 2014).

Besides these opportunity structures in the media, several factors in the structural and situational context on the macro level may influence the degree of populist communication in journalistic media, as illustrated in Figure 5.1 in the introduction in this volume (see also Reinemann et al., 2017). For instance, the political, journalistic, and issue culture of a country may affect how the media cover real-world events and politicians' actions and statements, and whether journalists may use populist key messages themselves. Moreover, journalistic media interact with citizens, which – depending on the country – may have varying predispositions, attitudes, opinions, or reality perceptions. On the one hand, this may be the result of media coverage in combination with other context factors. On the other hand, this may also influence news media coverage in a feedback loop. Finally, country-specific context factors, especially situational factors, are expected to change over time. Specific factors that are assumed to influence populist communication in news media across countries as well as over time, will be elaborated in more detail in the following chapters by Maurer et al. and Esser et al.

This chapter aims to answer four research questions. First, we investigate how the four core dimensions of populist communication are distributed in news coverage on immigration and in opinion pieces across twelve countries *(RQ1).* Second, we analyze how these core dimensions of populist communication are related to each other empirically *(RQ2).* Additionally, we seek to discover who the main speakers of populist key messages are *(RQ3).* Finally, we explore how 'the people', 'the elite', and 'the others' who are targeted in populist key messages, are defined across the investigated countries *(RQ4).*

Method

Sample

Our investigation concerning populism in the media includes twelve countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Norway, Poland, Serbia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These countries represent different geographical European areas and differ greatly in terms of structural factors (see the chapter by Maurer et al.) as well as situational factors (see the chapter by Esser et al.) that may influence the relationship between populism and the media. This allows us to analyze the relationship between populism and the media across different contextual settings. For instance, while in northern Europe populism is typically associated with right-wing populist parties, populism in southern Europe more often also includes left-wing populism (see also the chapters by Salgado et al. and Stanyer et al.). In western Europe, research on populism has often focused on populist parties' influence on long-established mainstream parties. In central and eastern European countries, populism has traditionally had a stronger focus on anti-elitism, the fight against corruption, and ethnic or religious minorities as out-groups (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017), though in the wake of the recent European

refugee crisis the focus has been shifting onto immigrants as the primary out-group for many central and eastern European countries (Stanley, 2017).

To allow, not only for a cross-national comparison, but also for a temporal comparison, our study includes two waves[1]. We used two constructed weeks, the first wave from February 22 - April 2, 2016, and the second wave from February 20 - April 1, 2017. For most countries, these two time periods represent routine time[1]. These periods were deliberately chosen in order to investigate the exact time frame across all twelve countries, to enhance comparability as well as to allow for the comparison of situational factors over time (see chapter by Esser et al.).

For each country, three leading newspapers fulfilling the following criteria, were selected: (a) they have a large reach among the audience and agenda-setting power for politicians and other media, (b) they represent both up-market and mass-market journalism, and (c) they represent different political leanings. For all newspapers, the digital version (E-Paper) was obtained for each day of the two constructed weeks (Table 5.1).[2]

Table 5.1 Media outlets in the sample

Country	Up-market		Mass-market
Bulgaria	24 Chassa	Trud	Telegraph
Czech Republic	Pravo	MF Dnes	Blesk
France	Le Figaro	Le Monde	Le Parisien
Germany	Die Welt	Süddeutsche Zeitung	B.Z.
Greece	Ta Nea	Kathimerini	Efimerida ton Syntakton
Israel	Haaretz	-	Yedioth Aharonoth Israel Hayom
Italy	Il Corriere della Sera	La Repubblica Il Giornale	-
Norway	Aftenposten	Dagsavisen	VG (Verdens gang)
Poland	Gazeta Wyborcza	Rzeczpospolita	Fakt
Serbia	Politika	Večernje novosti	Blic
Switzerland	NZZ	Tages-Anzeiger	Blick
United Kingdom	Telegraph	Guardian	Daily Mail

In selecting the articles, we followed two different sampling strategies. The first sample is based on the topic, whilst the second sample is based on the story type of an article. Articles that fulfilled the criteria of both sampling strategies were considered for both samples. Table 5.2 summarizes the sample numbers for both sampling strategies as well as for the overlap between the two.

[1] For two countries, France and the United Kingdom, only the second wave in 2017 was obtained. These two countries will therefore not be included in temporal comparisons.

The first sample, henceforth referred to as *immigration news sample,* focuses on articles (both news and commentary) related to the topic of immigration. We have chosen to focus on this topic because it has been described as one of the driving forces for the support for populist parties in western and northern Europe (Stanyer et al., 2017). It is particularly vulnerable to exclusionist populist rhetoric and poses a challenge, in particular, to responsible media coverage. Following this sampling strategy, articles were sampled using a search string consisting of words related to immigration, translated into the respective languages. To ensure comparability and functional equivalence, the translation of the search strings was completed with close co-operation between the different country teams, and the search terms were adapted or supplemented for individual countries. All articles which contained at least one of the terms in the respective search strings, were included in this first sampling pool. If this resulted in more than ten articles for an individual newspaper on a given day, a random sample of ten articles was drawn for that day.

Table 5.2 Number of news items in the samples across waves

	Immigration News Sample			Opinion Piece Sample			Sample Overlap		
	Year		Total	Year		Total	Year		Total
	2016	2017		2016	2017		2016	2017	
Bulgaria	30	13	43	17	16	33	4	0	8
Czech Republic	88	75	163	44	38	82	21	32	53
France	-	58	58	-	39	39	-	9	9
Germany	118	107	225	72	66	138	27	14	41
Greece	144	28	172	92	88	180	40	8	48
Israel	24	38	62	92	58	150	7	10	17
Italy	113	145	258	72	81	153	17	9	26
Norway	83	86	169	66	69	135	19	22	41
Poland	5	6	11	32	17	49	2	2	4
Serbia	31	26	57	42	42	84	4	1	5
Switzerland	125	107	232	59	66	125	26	19	45
United Kingdom	-	73	73	-	52	52	-	17	17
Total	761	762	1523	588	632	1220	167	143	310

Despite its centrality for populism in Europe, the discourse on immigration may be very different and of varying relevance in northern, southern, western, and central-eastern Europe. With this in mind, we have drawn a second sample. This second sample, henceforth referred to as *opinion piece sample*, is based on the story type or genre of an article and includes all opinion-oriented formats, regardless of their topic. This is grounded in the theoretical notion that interpretative or opinion-oriented journalism may be especially prone to populism (Esser et al., 2017; Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017). This sampling pool included all opinion pieces, editorials, columns, and commentaries that were explicitly labeled as such or are distinguished graphically from straight news articles, and which appeared in the following newspaper sections: politics, international politics, national politics, and regional politics. If an individual

newspaper contained more than five opinion-oriented articles on a given day, a random sample of five articles was drawn for that day (see Table 5.2).

Operationalization

Populist key messages. The most important concept in the conducted content analysis is, of course, populist communication. To measure this, we use an index of populist communication which is a formative measure (Diamantopoulos, Riefler, & Roth, 2008) consisting of the four dimensions described above: people-centrism, anti-elitism, restoring sovereignty, and exclusion. Twelve populist key messages, which were defined on theoretical grounds and each correspond to one dimension, were used as indicators. In the operationalization, we initially built on other recent international content analyses on populist communication (Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017; Müller et al., 2017; Wirth et al., 2016), which operationalize populist communication using three dimensions: people-centrism, anti-elitism, and restoring sovereignty. In order to attain the agreed upon definition of populism and populist communication in this book (see the introduction to this volume), and based upon the theoretical considerations elaborated above, we extended the existing operationalization with the additional dimension of "exclusion" (see also Engesser et al., 2017). This dimension was operationalized independently for this study at the article level.

Populist key messages: people-centrism. The first dimension – *people-centrism* – consists of four key messages that advocate for the people (Wirth et al., 2016). These key messages all require explicit mention of 'the people', which can be defined as the population of a country, those who share a common origin or culture, the citizens in contrast to those who govern them, or those without special rank or position in society. The people may be regarded as nation, ethnos, demos, class, or strata. In this study, we distinguish between political, economic, legal, geographical, cultural, religious, or generalized conceptualizations of 'the people'.

The people may be addressed as a whole, as a metaphor ('man on the street', 'the common man'), or as a subgroup that is regarded as representing all people. If subgroups are mentioned, it is crucial that *everyone* may consider themselves, at least hypothetically, to be a member of this subgroup (e.g. 'hardworking people' or 'voters' in contrast to 'women' or 'children'). Residents of a specific geographic area are also treated as the people (e.g. 'neighbors', 'people of London'). Subgroups that are widely regarded as social minorities (e.g. immigrants, criminals) or that express special interests or a specific clientele (e.g. teachers) are not considered to be the people. References to the people can be made through words such as 'Switzerland', 'Britain', '(the) public', '(the) citizen(s)', '(the) voter(s)', '(the) taxpayer(s)', '(the) resident(s)', '(the) consumer(s)', '(the) population', '(the) nation', etc.

First, a speaker using populist political communication can demonstrate his closeness to the people by *approaching the people*. This means that an actor (e.g. politician, journalist, or other actor) describes his or herself (or is described) as belonging to the people, being close to the people, knowing the people or their needs, speaking for the people, caring for the people, or approaching the people in any other similar way. The underlying idea of this key message is that the actor claims to represent or embody the people, or is seen as representing or embodying the people (Wirth et al., 2016).

Second, by *praising the people's virtues* a speaker may attribute and emphasize positive (personality) traits to the people, or express faith in the people's ability and judgment, such as common sense. For example, the people may be described as good, virtuous, moral, charismatic, credible, intelligent, competent, consistent, considerate, benevolent, etc. This category also applies if the people is cleared of being malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, extremist, racist, undemocratic, etc. (Wirth et al., 2016).

Third, an actor can *praise the people's achievements*. Here, in contrast to praising the people's virtues, praising the people's achievements focuses not on how the people is, but on what the people has done. This key message is coded if a positive development, situation, or success is associated with an effort by the people. Achievements include important, successful, or 'right' actions as well as other accomplishments (Wirth et al., 2016).

The fourth people-centrist key message is *describing the people as homogenous*. This refers to the monolithic conception of the people in a populist worldview and means that the people is seen as sharing a common understanding of the world, common feelings (e.g. 'the people's fears'), common opinions (e.g. approval/disapproval), or a common will (demands, plans, orders to the government, e.g. 'the people's will'). This is in direct contrast with the concept of a fractured, pluralist population of individuals with their own feelings, opinions, and desires, who do disagree on some points (e.g. some people/most of the people/many citizens/57% of the people) (Wirth et al., 2016).

Populist key messages: anti-elitism. The second dimension – *anti-elitism* – combines three key messages that are all conflictive toward the elites (Wirth et al., 2016). Actors can discredit or blame the elite in their communication, and in doing so, detach the elite from the people. 'The elite' is defined as those with the greatest power and influence within a society, especially because of their political power, wealth, or privilege. The elite can be allocated to the areas of politics, administration, economy, law, media, science, and culture. Additionally, the elite can be supranational or general (e.g. 'the powerful ones', 'the ones above', 'the system'). The elite may either be addressed in general terms, or by naming specific members of the elite.

The first anti-elitist key message, *discrediting the elite,* stresses negative personality traits, mistakes, and unlawful or immoral behavior of the elites. The elites or their representatives are portrayed as corrupt, evil, incapable, malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, undemocratic, etc. The elites, or their representatives, are denied of morality, charisma, credibility, intelligence, competence, consistency, etc. (Wirth et al., 2016).

The second anti-elitist key message, *blaming the elite*, focuses on specific actions of the elite. A speaker may hold the elite responsible or accountable for (or incapable of resolving) an undesirable or harmful situation. Thus, the elites are blamed for a negative development or situation, a specific failure, or a problem (Wirth et al., 2016).

The third anti-elitist key message, *detaching the elite from the people,* requires both the mention of 'the elite' and 'the people'. The elite is described as being detached from the people, as not belonging to the people, not being close to the people, not knowing the people and their needs, not speaking for the people, not caring for the people, not listening to the people, not performing everyday actions, or is distanced from the people in any other way. Ultimately,

detaching the elite from the people implies that it does not represent the people (Wirth et al., 2016).

Populist key messages: restoring sovereignty. The third dimension of populism, *restoring sovereignty,* comprises two key messages (Wirth et al., 2016). On one hand, an actor may *demand popular sovereignty* in two different ways. First, the speaker attributes power to the people by stating that the people should be able to decide on an issue, or that there is a democratic deficit. This means that the speaker argues for general institutional reforms to grant the people more power (i.e. by introducing direct-democratic elements). Second, the speaker may also argue in favor of implementing or enforcing the people's decisions, for instance after a referendum. On the other hand, an actor can also establish a negative and conflictive approach by *denying the sovereignty of the elite*. Here, the speaker argues in favor of granting less power to the elite within the context of a specific issue (e.g. election, immigration, security) or of general institutional reforms to confine the power of the elite (Wirth et al., 2016).

Populist key messages: exclusion. The fourth dimension, *exclusion,* contains three conflictive key messages towards specific social out-groups framed as 'the others'. 'The others' are defined as population segments that are excluded from 'the people' or juxtaposed to them. The others may be addressed as any subgroup, minority, or clientele that does not fall into the category of the people or the elite. Examples of such groups are immigrants, specific ethnic or religious groups, criminals, homosexuals, etc. Similar to anti-elitism, actors, first, may *discredit specific groups* by denouncing, criticizing, and/or stigmatizing them. Thereby, negative personality traits, mistakes, and unlawful or immoral behavior of specific social groups are stressed. Second, actors may *blame specific groups* or hold them responsible for an undesirable or harmful situation or development. Third, actors may *exclude specific groups from the people*. These groups are characterized as 'the others' – as not belonging to the people or not sharing their virtues. We distinguish between political, economic, legal, geographical, cultural, and religious conceptualizations of 'the others' (see also Cranmer, 2011; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).

These twelve populist key messages were all measured as dummy variables. For each category, we coded at the story level, whether a given populist key message was present in an article or not – regardless of the speaker. For each dimension of populist communication, a maximum index, i.e. a dummy variable, was calculated where 1 indicates that at least one of the corresponding key messages was present. For the overall *populism in the media index*, the four dimension indices were summed up, indicating how many of the four dimensions were present for each article. Thus, the populism in the media index is a sum index ranging from 0 to 4. A value of 0 means that the analyzed articles contained no populist key message. A value of 4 would mean that each story analyzed contained key messages from all four dimensions of populism.

Speakers. For each populist key message, we coded whether the speaker was a political actor, a media actor, a citizen, or another actor. A speaker is an actor who was quoted in the news item either directly or indirectly. If a populist statement was made by the actual journalist, the speaker was coded as a media actor. If different speakers within an article voiced the same key message, it was coded for each speaker type.

Inter-Coder Reliability Across Countries

The material was coded by a total of 26 coders. The country teams recruited native speaking coders from the respective countries, whose English proficiency was sufficient to read the codebook in English and to complete the coder training and reliability testing using English language material. Ensuring a common understanding of a codebook and inter-coder reliability across countries is a major challenge in comparative research (see e.g., Hopmann, Esser, & de Vreese, 2017; Rössler, 2012). Therefore, we took several steps to ensure inter-coder reliability. First, proceeding from an initial five-day coder training of eight Swiss coders, we conducted several pre-tests, based on which some variable descriptions and definitions were revised and discussed. Second, we conducted a three-day international coder training with a core-team of three countries to ensure and improve the international applicability of the constructs to be measured. Third, we conducted an intensive three-day international coder training with coders from all countries. In a fourth and final step, we formally tested the inter-coder reliability based on English-language material (31 online news articles) before the start of the country-specific coding.

As Table 5.3 clarifies, we report percentage agreement, Brennan and Prediger's Kappa (Brennan & Prediger, 1981), as well as two versions of Fretwurst's Lotus (Fretwurst, 2015a, 2015b). The unstandardized *Lotus* can be directly interpreted and represents the percentage agreement of coders with the category most used by all coders. The standardized *Lotus* is a chance-corrected version that also takes into account, the number of categories used by coders. Brennan and Prediger's Kappa is similar to *S-Lotus* but is based on standard percentage agreement among all coders. Both measures are more robust in assessing the reliability of rare categories and multiple coders, than Krippendorff's Alpha and Cohen's Kappa (Hopmann et al., 2017; Quarfoot & Levine, 2016)[3].

With regard to the unstandardized *Lotus,* all variable groups achieved satisfactory inter-coder reliability scores. Only the scores for 'secondary topic' were somewhat lower. The chance-corrected *S-Lotus* scores and Brennan and Prediger's *k* were generally slightly lower. The coding of formal variables still achieved good standardized inter-coder reliability scores. With regard to the topic variables, the reliability of the 'secondary' and 'tertiary' topic was somewhat lower. With regard to the substantive variables to measure populism, the results were still acceptable. However, the results for variables such as 'discrediting the elite', 'blaming the elite', and 'detaching the elite from the people', were slightly lower. This may be partly due to the substantial closeness of these categories, since the reliability improved when the variables were combined into a dummy variable for anti-elitism (*S-Lotus* for anti-elitism = .75). The style variables (except for 'privatization') also achieved lower standardized reliability scores. This was somewhat to be expected due to their evaluative character (see e.g.,Hopmann et al., 2017).

As these scores show, the reliability of our codebook could be further improved. However, we wish to emphasize that the material used for the reliability testing was in English, which was not the native language for most of the coders, while the actual coding of the material was completed in the coders' native language. The choice of English-language material was necessary to compare reliability across all countries. However, reliability tests in a project language typically result in lower reliability scores and thus, may underestimate the quality of the actual coding (Hopmann et al., 2017; Rössler, 2012).

Table 5.3 Reliability scores for the content analysis

Type	Variable	% Agreement	Brennan & Prediger's K	Lotus	S-Lotus
Formal	Outlet	97	.97	.98	.98
	Author	83	.80	.89	.89
	Political author	97	.96	.97	.97
	Length of article	84	.79	.89	.85
	Story type	77	.73	.84	.83
Topic	Primary topic	72	.70	.82	.81
	Secondary topic	34	.30	.49	.48
	Tertiary topic	56	.54	.71	.7
Populism	Approaching the people	70	.41	.78	.57
	Praising the people's virtues	92	.83	.94	.89
	Praising the people's achievements	97	.94	.98	.96
	Describing the people as homogenous	71	.41	.79	.58
	Discrediting the elite	61	.22	.71	.42
	Blaming the elite	67	.34	.76	.51
	Detaching the elite from the people	71	.42	.8	.6
	Demanding popular sovereignty	91	.82	.94	.89
	Denying elite sovereignty	99	.98	.99	.99
	Excluding 'others' from the people	79	.57	.85	.71
	Discrediting 'others'	89	.78	.93	.86
	Blaming 'others'	87	.74	.91	.83
	People-centrism (Dummy)	67	.35	.76	.53
	Anti-elitism (Dummy)	81	.61	.88	.75
	Sovereignty (Dummy)	90	.80	.94	.87
	Exclusion (Dummy)	73	.45	.81	.61
Styles	Negativity	44	.33	.59	.49
	Negativity (dummy)	68	.52	.81	.62
	Emotional tone	44	.26	.6	.4
	Emotional tone (dummy)	71	.42	.82	.64
	Dramatization	47	.29	.62	.42
	Dramatization (dummy)	64	.27	.78	.57
	Privatization	84	.76	.9	.8
	Polarization	55	.33	.67	.35
	Colloquial language	64	.46	.74	.47
Total		74	.58	.81	.69

Results

In this chapter, we concentrate on descriptive results in response to the research questions. First, we provide an initial comparison of the levels of the four dimensions of populist

key messages – people-centrism, anti-elitism, sovereignty, and exclusion – across countries. Second, we investigate the relationship between the dimensions. Finally, we compare speakers as well as targets of populist key messages across countries. To ensure comparability and functional equivalence across countries, we conducted most of the following data analyses for the two different samples, separately. However, we draw comparisons between the opinion piece and the immigration news sample where we believe that such comparisons are meaningful. While the following chapter by Maurer et al. will focus solely on the second wave and the chapter by Esser et al. will compare the two waves, in this chapter the data from both waves was combined.

Dimensions of Populism in News Coverage (*RQ1*)

Let us first look at the overall distribution of populist key messages in the investigated articles. In the opinion piece sample (N = 1220), more than half of all articles (59%, n = 714) contained at least one populist key message. Most of these articles contained only one dimension of populist communication (47%, n = 568). Around a tenth of articles (11%, n = 131) had two dimensions and only around 1% (n = 15) included three or all four dimensions. By far the most commonly used dimension of populist communication was anti-elitism, which occurred in about half of all articles (51%, n = 617). People-centrism occurred in 14% (n = 169), exclusion in 6% (n = 67), and sovereignty was almost absent (2%, n = 23). In the immigration sample (N = 1523), the distribution of populist key messages showed similarities but also notable differences. While the order of the four dimensions was the same, the proportion of articles that contained at least one populist key message was around 20% lower (40%, n = 604). Around a third of all articles contained one dimension of populism (32%, n = 491), 6% (n = 96) included two dimensions, and 1% contained three or four dimensions (n = 17). Thereby, anti-elitist messages appeared in 30% of all articles (n = 459) and people-centrism in 9% (n = 135). Remarkably, with 8% (n = 126), exclusion was the only dimension that occurred more often in the immigration sample than in the opinion piece sample. Finally, key messages related to the sovereignty dimension were, again, only very seldom used (1%, n = 16).

In a second step, we compared the levels of populism descriptively across countries. Figure 5.2 compares the extent of the overall *populism in the media index* between the two samples, and shows that there is a strong correlation between them (b = 1.04, $b = .83$, $p < .001$, $R^2 = .65$). This indicates a "synchronization" between news reports and commentary in the sense of Schoenbach (2008). However, the level of populism was lower in the immigration news sample than in the opinion piece sample for all countries, except for the Czech Republic which showed the same level of populism across both samples (39%).

For both samples, the highest levels of populism were found in Israel and Poland, and the lowest levels in Norway. In relation to Poland, however, we have to bear in mind that with 49 opinion pieces and only eleven articles on immigration, its results were based on the smallest sample among the countries.[4] When we compare the two samples relating to the country order, Germany, Bulgaria, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic were ranked higher in the immigration news sample compared to the opinion piece sample, whereas Greece, France, the United Kingdom, and Serbia were ranked lower.



Figure 5.2 Comparison between the two samples relating to the degree of populism expressed by the populism in the media index (values 0-4)

Note. The grey line depicts a linear regression (b = 1.04, b = .83, p < .001, R^2 = .65, N = 12).

Figure 5.3 displays the distribution of the four dimensions of populist communication across countries for the two samples. In both samples and across all countries, anti-elitism was the most prominent dimension of populist communication, mostly followed by people-centrism, although some differences, which will be discussed in more detail below, could be identified between countries.

Populism in opinion pieces appeared to be mostly driven by anti-elitism. This applied especially to Poland and Greece, whereas in Bulgaria and Norway, commentaries were least anti-elitist. A more people-centrist populist rhetoric was found in commentaries in the United Kingdom, France, and Israel. In these three countries, between 20% and 40% of opinion pieces included people-centrist key messages, while in Italy and Norway it was less than 5%.





Figure 5.3 The four dimensions of populist communication in opinion pieces and immigration news across countries

Note. The Y-axis reports mean values of indicators per dimension (0-1) which correspond to the share of articles that contain the respective dimension. The four dimensions add up to the populism in the media index (0-4).

Bulgaria was the only country with a more exclusionist than people-centrist rhetoric in opinion-oriented articles. In Germany and Israel, the levels of exclusion were also high at 10% and 15% respectively. In the remaining countries, less than 5% of opinion pieces contained exclusionist key messages. Sovereignty was below 5% across all countries except for the United Kingdom where, at 8%, it surpassed exclusion. Israel exhibited the most complete populist communication with relatively high levels in all dimensions.

Similar to opinion pieces, populist communication in immigration news was largely dominated by anti-elitism. Again, the media conveyed most anti-elitist messages in Poland and Greece, followed by Israel and Germany. Immigration news was least anti-elitist in Norway, followed by Serbia, where anti-elitism was distinctly lower in comparison to opinion pieces. People-centrism in immigration news was highest in Israel, trailed by Bulgaria, Greece, and Switzerland. The levels of people-centrism in the United Kingdom, which were the highest in the opinion piece sample, were notably lower in the immigration sample. A similar tendency was found for France. Although articles on immigration seemed to be overall less populist than opinion pieces, they contained more exclusionist key messages, especially in Israel, Germany, and Bulgaria. In the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Serbia, exclusionist key messages appeared more often than people-centrist key messages. As in the opinion piece sample, Israel displayed the most complete populist communication, except for the absence of the sovereignty dimension.

Relationship Between the Dimensions of Populist Communication (*RQ2*)

As we elaborated in the theory and methods, we conceive of populist communication as a formative concept based on four dimensions which complement each other. However, the question remains about how these four dimensions relate to each other empirically. In response to the second research question, we investigated these relationships in our data.

On the story level, almost all bivariate correlations between the four dimensions were significantly positive in both samples (see Table 5.4). However, what we are even more interested in is the correlation of these dimensions on an aggregated level. This allows us to compare the relationship between dimensions across countries.

Table 5.4 Bivariate correlations between dimensions of populist communication on the story level

	People-Centrism		**Anti-Elitism**		**Sovereignty**		**Exclusion**	
	Opinion	**Immigr.**	**Opinion**	**Immigr.**	**Opinion**	**Immigr.**	**Opinion**	**Immigr.**
People-Centrism	1	1	$.07^{*}$	$.12^{**}$	$.12^{**}$	$.06^{*}$	$.06^{*}$	$.12^{*}$
Anti-Elitism	$.07^{*}$	$.12^{*}$	1	1	$.08^{**}$	.02	-.01	$.06^{*}$
Sovereignty	$.12^{**}$	$.06^{*}$	$.08^{**}$	.02	1	1	.02	$.06^{*}$
Exclusion	$.06^{*}$	$.12^{*}$	-.01	$.06^{*}$	.02	$.06^{*}$	1	1

Notes. $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, Opinion piece sample: $N = 1220$, Immigration sample: $N = 1523$

Figure 5.4 illustrates the relationship between the first two dimensions, people-centrism and anti-elitism, across the twelve countries in the immigration news sample. As the figure shows, there was a curvilinear relationship between the two dimensions (R^2 = .54, p < .05). Thus, higher levels of people-centrism in the media did not necessarily lead to higher levels of anti-elitism, and vice versa. There were some countries, for example Greece and Poland, with high levels of anti-elitism but comparatively low levels of people-centrism. Other countries, such as Norway, Italy, and the Czech Republic were low on both dimensions. Finally, some countries had moderate to high levels of both people-centrism and anti-elitism. Among those were, for example, Israel, Switzerland, and France.

Figure 5.5 analogously depicts the relationship between people-centrism and exclusion in the immigration sample. Different to its relationship with anti-elitism, people-centrism rather had a linear relationship with exclusion (b = 0.88, p < .001, R^2 = .45, p < .01). Hence, the more people-centrist news on immigration in a country, the more exclusionist key messages it contained.



Figure 5.4 Immigration sample: Relation between people-centrism & anti-elitism

Note. Values represent country means of indicators per dimension (0-1) which correspond to the share of articles that contain the respective dimension.



Figure 5.5 Immigration sample: Relationship between people-centrism and exclusion
Note. Values represent country means of indicators per dimension (0-1) which correspond to the share of articles that contain the respective dimension.

Finally, Figure 5.6 compares the extent of anti-elitism and exclusion across countries in the immigration sample. Similar to people-centrism and anti-elitism, a curvilinear relation was found (R^2 = .46, $p < .05$). This implies that more anti-elitism does not always lead to higher levels of exclusion. Rather, with regard to immigration coverage, there were some countries where the target of populist key messages was rather the elite (e.g. Poland and Greece), whereas in other countries 'the others' were more often the target (e.g. Israel, Germany, and Bulgaria). However, it must be kept in mind that in all countries the level of anti-elitism was much higher than the levels of exclusion and people-centrism. Thus, the scales in Figures 5.4 to 5.6 were adapted to the empirical maximum of the three dimensions to better illustrate the relationship between them.

In summary, the relationships between the three dimensions, people-centrism, anti-elitism, and exclusion in the immigration sample, indicate that only people-centrism and exclusion correlated linearly, while there was a curvilinear relationship between anti-elitism and the other two dimensions. The same tendencies could be identified for the opinion piece sample; however, there the relationships were not statistically significant. Thus, people-centrism, anti-elitism, and exclusion were more clearly related in news on immigration than in opinion pieces.

Furthermore, relationships with the additional dimension of populist communication, sovereignty, were not included since, due to the low case numbers, no patterns of relationship could be identified.



Figure 5.6 Immigration sample: Relationship between anti-elitism and exclusion

Note. Values represent country means of indicators per dimension (0-1) which correspond to the share of articles that contain the respective dim

Comparison of Speakers (*RQ3*)

As explained in the theoretical section, it is relevant to determine who the originators of populist key messages are. From a theoretical perspective, the most important distinction is whether the speakers of populist key messages are journalists themselves, or politicians who are quoted in the articles. Journalists (n = 856, 64.9% of articles with populist key messages) and politicians (n = 384, 29.1%) were also, empirically, the two most important speaker categories across all investigated countries and both samples. Figure 5.7 compares the average extent of populist communication by political speakers and media speakers per country between samples. In contrast to the earlier figures, the samples were distinguished into three groups: articles that only belong to the immigration sample (circle shape), articles that only belong to the opinion sample (square shape), and articles that are part of both samples (i.e. opinion pieces on the topic of immigration; triangle shape). We made this additional distinction here because

earlier research implies that those voicing populist messages may be different for opinion-oriented and straight news (Blassnig, Ernst, Büchel, Engesser, & Esser, 2018; Hameleers et al., 2017). Analogous to the overall populism in the media index, the two indices for political speaker and media speaker are sum indices of dummy variables for the four dimensions (0-4). Thus, the x-axis shows the extent of populist communication by media speakers, and the y-axis the extent of populist communication by political speakers, both aggregated on the country level per sub-sample. The solid line represents how the distribution would look if there were a perfect linear relationship between the speaker types and, thus, a one to one ratio. Data points that are plotted below the solid line, have more populist key messages by media speakers than by political speakers, and for data points above the solid line, the opposite is true.



Figure 5.7. Comparison of political and media speakers expressed by the populism in the media index

Note. Values represent country means of the populism in the media index (0-4) per speaker type.

As figure 5.7 reveals, across all countries, news articles on immigration exhibited higher levels of populism by political speakers, whereas opinion pieces (regardless of the topic) displayed higher levels of populism by media speakers. There were two exceptions: In Bulgaria, opinion pieces had higher levels of populism by political speakers, and in Switzerland, news articles on immigration had higher levels of populism by media speakers. In Polish immigration news and French opinion pieces, the ratio between political and media speakers was one to one.

Thus, populism by journalists was higher in opinion-oriented pieces ($M = 0.56$, $SD = 0.67$) than in immigration news ($M = 0.13$, $SD = 0.37$, $F = 410.64$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .13$), while news articles on immigration were more dominated by populism by political speakers ($M = 0.21$, $SD = 0.47$) than opinion pieces ($M = 0.12$, $SD = 0.35$, $F = 33.77$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .012$). This seems reasonable and in line with theoretical expectations as well as with other recent studies (Blassnig et al., 2018; Hameleers et al., 2017).

Comparison of Targets (*RQ4*)

Finally, to answer *RQ4*, we compared the three target groups of populist communication across the analyzed countries: 'the elite', 'the people', and 'the others'. For each populist key message, which had to be aimed at one or two of these target groups, we coded how these groups were defined. Hereafter, we discuss how the elite, the people, and the others were conceptualized in the analyzed articles across countries. In contrast to the previous analyses, we did not differentiate between the two samples. On one hand, this was due to low case numbers for the individual target groups. On the other hand, similar patterns could be identified for both samples.

Firstly, across all countries, the most prominently targeted elite of populist key messages was the political elite (on average in 78%, n = 840, of all articles containing 'the elite' as target of populist key messages, n = 1079). This was followed by the supranational elite (11%, n = 121), which in most cases will be the European Union. All other elites were attacked considerably less often (in less than 10%).

Secondly, 'the people', who is typically the target of positive and advocative populist key messages, were mostly addressed in a generalized or unspecific manner (on average in 49%, n = 237, of all articles containing key messages targeting the people, n = 484). This was followed by a political notion of the people (27%, n = 129) which describes the people in their political function within society, e.g. as voters, electorate, taxpayers, or citizens. However, a geographical conception of the people was more common in Norway, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, and France. This implies an emphasis on national borders and foreigners. Legal (e.g. 'law-abiding), economic (e.g. 'hardworking), religious (e.g., 'Christians'), or cultural (e.g. 'occidental') definitions of the people were found in less than 10% of all articles that contained "the people" as a target for populist key messages.

Conceptualizations of 'the others' are, in theory, closely related to conceptions of 'the people'. Therefore, 'the others' can be differentiated into the same subgroups. However, as the others are, by definition, a specific social group, they cannot be 'general or unspecified'. While exclusion of others is generally low across all countries, there were differences in how 'the others' were defined. Similar to 'the people', 'the others' were most often defined in a political manner (on average in 40%, n = 77, of all articles containing key messages targeting 'the others', n = 139) which refers to persons within their own country who are not legal citizens or who are excluded from the political function of the people (e.g. non-citizens). Exceptions were Israel and Bulgaria, where cultural (e.g. 'oriental') or religious (e.g. 'Muslims') conceptualizations of 'the others' were more important, as well as France, where 'the others' were mostly defined in geographical terms (e.g. 'foreigners'). Economic (e.g. 'the poor') or legal (e.g. 'criminals') reasons for the exclusion of 'others' were very seldom found.

Some connections between the conceptualization of ‘the people’ and the ‘others’ could be identified. This was most noticeable in relation to the importance of religious aspects in Israel and Poland, as well as cultural aspects in Israel and Bulgaria. However, there were also notable differences. For example, religion played a more important role in the definition of ‘others’ than of ‘the people’ in most countries, whereas economic differentiations were more relevant for ‘the people’ than ‘the others’. Finally, which elite was targeted did not seem to be directly related to how ‘the people’ or ‘the others’ were defined. Rather, the political elite was the main focus of anti-elitism in all countries.

Discussion and Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to introduce the theoretical background for the analysis of populism in the media, as well as to provide a detailed description of the method of the international content analysis of immigration news and opinion pieces in print media across twelve countries and two waves. Furthermore, this chapter presented first descriptive results regarding the four dimensions of populist communication *(RQ1)*, their relationship *(RQ2)*, speakers *(RQ3)*, and targets *(RQ4)* across countries as well as across both samples.

Overall, the news media included populist key messages to the highest extent in Israel and Poland, and lowest in Norway. While in some countries populist communication seemed to be more common in opinion pieces (United Kingdom, France, Serbia), in other countries populism seemed to be more specific to immigration news coverage (Germany, Bulgaria, Czech Republic). However, opinion pieces had a higher tendency to be populist than immigration news across all countries. This may be explained by the fact that in straight news articles, journalists follow professional norms, such as objectivity, more strictly than in opinion pieces which may have a generally more polemic nature and where the media may be more critical towards the establishment and more advocative on behalf of the people (Blassnig et al., 2018; Esser et al., 2017; Hameleers et al., 2017). Moreover, news on immigration contained more exclusionist key messages. This confirms the theoretical expectations that the topic of immigration is particularly vulnerable to exclusionist populist rhetoric.

With regard to the first research question, the descriptive results showed similarities as well as notable differences across countries. In all countries, of the four dimensions of populism, news media mostly conveyed anti-elitism in their articles and commentaries. However, since it is very difficult to draw a clear distinction between populist and “normal” elite criticism, these high levels of anti-elitism need to be interpreted with some caution. Although we would argue that blaming, discrediting, or detaching the elite from the people as defined in our operationalization, provides a fertile ground for populism by itself, only in combination with the other dimensions does it represent complete populism.

In Greek, Polish, and German media especially, an anti-elitist populism prevailed. In Greece and Poland, besides the generalized ‘government’, this anti-elitism was also often addressed towards the supranational or media elite respectively. This may be attributable to the strong populist parties in these countries. However, since in both countries populist actors were

in government at the time, some anti-elitist critique may have also been directed at them. Germany was also among the countries with the highest levels of excluding key messages in the media (together with Israel and Bulgaria). While this may partly be explained by the recent rise of the populist right-wing party *AfD*, it was mostly due to the frequent, and to some extent, innocuous juxtaposition of refugees and the populace in the press, given that Germany was the main host country for Syrian refugees. In Bulgaria, this can be related to the nationalist parties whose populist rhetoric has intensified specifically with regard to the topic of immigration, expressing discontent both with European immigration policies as well as with Bulgarian authorities (Raycheva, 2017). Israeli news media exhibited the most complete form of populism, with relatively high levels of all four dimensions. On one hand, this was surprising since, unlike most countries in the sample, Israel does not have political parties commonly known to be populist. On the other hand, this can be explained by the deep social cleavages in Israeli society and the ongoing struggles over the very definition of 'the people', which make populist rhetoric ubiquitous across the political spectrum (Weiss Yaniv & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, 2017).

However, in other countries such as Switzerland, Bulgaria, and France, the media included moderate to high levels of populist communication on all four dimensions. Journalists were the least likely to incorporate populism into articles or commentaries in Norway, Serbia, and Italy. Mostly with regard to the latter, this was rather surprising given that in Italy, populist parties have been on the rise for some time (Bobba & Legnante, 2017). However, this may be due to several high-level political events (constitutional reform, resignation of prime minister, appointment of new government) that may have shifted the media's attention (see also the chapter by Esser et al. in this volume).

In response to the second research question, we found significant correlations among the four dimensions on the story level. On an aggregated level, related to the findings already summarized, we identified a curvilinear relationship between people-centrism and anti-elitism as well as between anti-elitism and exclusion. Thus, in some countries the media seemed to display a more people-centrist populism, while in other countries populism in the media was more anti-elitist or exclusionist. People-centrism and exclusion, in contrast, had a linear relation, indicating that higher levels of people-centrism were associated with higher levels of exclusion in the media. This implies that the media may contribute to the construction of an antagonism between in and out-groups.

With regard to the speakers, the descriptive analysis showed that in opinion pieces, journalists mostly communicated populist key messages themselves, while they predominantly cited populist key messages by political speakers in straight news on immigration. Thus, populism *by* the media may most likely be identified in opinion-oriented media formats, while populism *through* the media is more common in straight news. However, one must keep in mind that also, populist statements by political actors must pass the editorial gates and are thus subject to journalistic selection.

Finally, with regard to the target groups of populist communication, a first descriptive glance showed that while journalists or politicians conceptualized 'the people' mostly in a generalized or unspecific manner, they defined 'the elite' and 'the others' most often in political terms. This indicates a more general form of populism, defining the people as 'sovereign', that

can be applied across the whole political spectrum (Kriesi, 2014). Moreover, we could not confirm that the conceptualizations of the three target groups were as closely connected empirically as was theoretically implied. We also identified certain differences that may be explained by the country-specific context. This applied, for example, to Israel, Poland, and Bulgaria where cultural and religious notions of 'the people' and 'the others' seemed to be more important. This can be attributed to the strong position of the Catholic Church in Poland, of the Eastern Orthodox Church in Bulgaria, as well as with the specific role of the Roma as minority. In Israel, this can be related to the conflict between different religious and ethnic groups, most notably between the Jewish and Arab population, but also within Jewish society (e.g., ultra-orthodox Jews are often cast as "the others").

As with any investigation, this study has certain limitations. First, while we conducted a comparative analysis in twelve countries across four different European regions, our country selection and thus, our scope, is limited. Second, within these countries we only analyzed a limited sample of print news outlets. Thus, our findings cannot be generalized to other mass media channels, online, or social media platforms. Third, while we believe that our two sampling strategies complement each other, we only looked at certain story types' respective issues. Thus, our findings may be specific to the respective news culture in relation to opinion-oriented journalism as well as the specific issue culture with regard to the topic of immigration. However, this can also be used as a strength in terms of the analysis, as the following chapters by Maurer et al. and Esser et al. will demonstrate. Nevertheless, our sampling strategies may have led to some bias as the large differences in sample sizes between countries indicates. For instance, in countries where immigration is not a continuously heated issue on the political and media agenda (e.g., Israel, Poland), the sample of two constructed weeks of immigration news may not be representative of populist communication in these countries. However, the opinion piece sample, which often corroborated the patterns found in the immigration sample, helped to offset this limitation. Finally, so far we have not analyzed how the populist key messages were presented in the media. While news media may neutrally disseminate such messages based on criteria such as newsworthiness or objectivity, they may also challenge populist messages, for example, responding to anti-elitism directed at the media or to expose populism as a threat to democracy (Wettstein, Esser, Schulz, Wirz, & Wirth, 2018). In contrast, journalists could also provide a favorable setting for populist messages by reinforcing or legitimizing them. This important aspect for the interpretation of the extent of populism in the media across countries, was not addressed in this first descriptive analysis.

This chapter provides the basis for the next two chapters. Thus, the following chapters build on the definition of populist communication, the conceptual framework, and the described methodological approach. While the data analysis in this chapter has remained descriptive, the chapter by Maurer et al. takes a more explanatory approach and tries to identify specific factors that explain differences in the levels of populist communication and its dimensions across countries and media outlets. The chapter by Esser et al. will then focus on a temporal perspective and try to understand the influence of situational factors by comparing differences in populism in the media between the two time waves.

Acknowledgments

We are very grateful for the important contribution to our project by our 27 coders (in alphabetical order): Kinga Adamczewska, Cristina Cremonesi, Leandra Helbling, Muriel Hoffmann, Jakub Jakubowski, Achilleas Karadimitriou, Maria Kostala, Vanessa Lochbaum, Kristina Malesevic, Hélène Mangold, Peter Maurer, Ana Milojevic, Dobrinka Peicheva, Ondřej Pekáček, Dominic Pfister, Lilia Raycheva, Lisa Reutter, Signe Ringdal, Patricia Rodi, Sergio Röthlisberger, Claire Ruffio, Felix Schönenberger, Agnieszka Stępińska, Václav Štětka, Marian Tomov, Naama Weiss Yaniv.

Funding

Apart from the COST network, this study was made possible by various means of national funding: Bulgarian Fund of Scientific Research (no. DCOST 01/01-17.05.2017, DCOST 01/02-17.05.2017), the Czech Science Foundation (no.14-05575S), the Polish National Science Center (no. 2015/18/M/HS5/00080), and the Swiss National Science Foundation (no. 174628).

Notes

[1] Exceptions were France (where national presidential elections took place on April 23 and May 7, 2017) and Bulgaria (where national parliamentary elections took place on March 26, 2017).

[2] In Greece, Israel, and Bulgaria, where the digital versions were not obtainable, the newspapers were gathered in print.

[3] For a good summary of *Lotus*'s advantages and an example of its application for international comparative content analysis, see also Hopmann et al (2017).

[4] There are two reasons for this: First, national policy issues were of higher relevance in Poland than the international immigration crisis. Second, the distinction between opinion-oriented and straight news format is not as straightforward in Poland as it is in other countries.

References

Aalberg, T., & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). Introduction: Comprehending populist political communication. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. de Vreese (Eds.), *Populist political communication in Europe* (pp. 3–11). New York: Routledge.

Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Reinemann, C., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. H. (Eds.). (2017). *Populist political communication in Europe*. New York: Routledge.

Abts, K., & Rummens, S. (2007). Populism versus democracy. *Political Studies*, *55*(2), 405–424. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00657.x

Albertazzi, D., & McDonnell, D. (2008). Introduction: A new spectre for Western Europe. In D. Albertazzi, & D. McDonnell (Eds.), *Twenty-first century populism: the spectre of Western European democracy* (pp. 1–11). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Blassnig, S., Ernst, N., Büchel, F., Engesser, S., & Esser, F. (2018). Populism in online election coverage: Analyzing populist statements by politicians, journalists, and readers in three countries. *Journalism Studies*, *38*(1), 1–20. doi: 10.1080/1461670X.2018.1487802

Bobba, G., & Legnante, G. (2017). Italy: A breeding ground for populist political communication. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. de Vreese (Eds.), *Populist political communication in Europe* (pp. 221–234). New York: Routledge.

Brennan, R. L., & Prediger, D. J. (1981). Coefficient Kappa: Some uses, misuses, and alternatives. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *41*(3), 687–699. doi: 10.1177/001316448104100307

Canovan, M. (1981). *Populism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Canovan, M. (2002). Taking politics to the people: Populism as the ideology of democracy. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), *Democracies and the populist challenge* (pp. 25–44). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cranmer, M. (2011). Populist communication and publicity: An empirical study of contextual differences in Switzerland. *Swiss Political Science Review*, *17*(3), 286–307. doi: 10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02019.x

De Vreese, C. H., Esser, F., Aalberg, T., Reinemann, C., & Stanyer, J. (2018). Populism as an expression of political communication content and style: A new perspective. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *20*(9), 1-16. doi: 10.1177/1940161218790035

Diamantopoulos, A., Riefler, P., & Roth, K. P. (2008). Advancing formative measurement models. *Journal of Business Research*, *61*(12), 1203–1218. doi: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2008.01.009

Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F., & Büchel, F. (2016). Populism and social media: How politicians spread a fragmented ideology. *Information, Communication & Society, 20(8),* 1109-1126. doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2016.1207697.

Engesser, S., Fawzi, N., & Larsson, A. O. (2017). Populist online communication: Introduction to the special issue. *Information, Communication & Society*, *20*(9), 1279–1292.

Ernst, N., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Blassnig, S., & Esser, F. (2017). Extreme parties and populism: An analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries. *Information, Communication & Society*, *13*(2), 1–18. doi: 10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328525

Esser, F., Stępińska, A., & Hopmann, D. (2017). Populism and the media: Cross-national findings and perspectives. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. de

Vreese (Eds.), *Populist political communication in Europe* (pp. 365–380). New York: Routledge.

Fretwurst, B. (2015a). Lotus manual. Retrieved from www.iakom.ch/lotusEnglish.html

Fretwurst, B. (2015b). Reliabilität und Validität von Inhaltsanalysen: Mit Erläuterungen zur Berechnung des Reliabilitätskoeffizienten 'Lotus' mit SPSS. In W. Wirth, K. Sommer, M. Wettstein, & J. Matthes (Eds.), *Methoden und Forschungslogik der Kommunikationswissenschaft. Qualitätskriterien in der Inhaltsanalyse* (1st ed., pp. 176–203). Köln, Germany: Herbert von Halem Verlag.

Hameleers, M., Bos, L., & Vreese, C. H. de (2017). Shoot the messenger? The media's role in framing populist attributions of blame. *Journalism*, *38*(1), 1–20. doi: 10.1177/1464884917698170

Hopmann, D., Esser, F., & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). How we did it: Approach and methods. In C. H. de Vreese, F. Esser, & D. N. Hopmann (Eds.), *Comparing political journalism* (pp. 10–21). London: Routledge.

Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. *European Journal of Political Research*, *46*(3), 319–345. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00690.x

Krämer, B. (2014). Media populism: A conceptual clarification and some theses on its effects. *Communication Theory*, *24*(1), 42–60. doi: 10.1111/comt.12029

Kriesi, H. (2014). The populist challenge. *West European Politics*, *37*(2), 361–378. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2014.887879

Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Populism and the media. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), *Twenty-first century populism: the spectre of Western European democracy* (pp. 49–64). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mazzoleni, G. (2014). Mediatization and political populism. In F. Esser & J. Strömbäck (Eds.), *Mediatization of politics: understanding the transformation of Western democracies* (pp. 42–56). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mény, Y., & Surel, Y. (2002). The constitutive ambiguity of populism. In Y. Mény & Y. Surel (Eds.), *Democracies and the populist challenge* (pp. 1–21). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mudde, C. (2004). The populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, *39*(4), 542–563. doi: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Müller, P., Schemer, C., Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Wirz, D. S., Engesser, S., & Wirth, W. (2017). The polarizing impact of news coverage on populist attitudes in the public: Evidence from a panel study in gour European Democracies. *Journal of Communication*, *67*(6), 968–992. doi: 10.1111/jcom.12337

Quarfoot, D., & Levine, R. A. (2016). How robust are multirater interrater reliability indices to changes in frequency distribution? *The American Statistician*, *70*(4), 373–384. doi: 10.1080/00031305.2016.1141708

Raycheva, L. (2017). Bulgaria: the migrant influx. In M. Barlai, B. Fähnrich, C. Griessler, & M. Rhomberg (Eds.), *Studien zur politischen Kommunikation: Band/Volume 13. The migrant crisis: European perspectives and national discourses* (pp. 79–92). Zürich, Switzerland: LIT-Verlag.

Reinemann, C., Aalberg, T., Esser, F., Strömbäck, J., & de Vreese, C. H. (2017). Populist political communication: Toward a model of its causes, forms, and effects. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. de Vreese (Eds.), *Populist political communication in Europe* (pp. 12–25). New York: Routledge.

Rössler, P. (2012). Comparative content analysis. In F. Esser & T. Hanitzsch (Eds.), *International Communication Association (ICA) handbook series. Handbook of comparative communication research* (pp. 459–468). New York: Routledge.

Schoenbach, K. (2008). Synchronization of the news. In W. Donsbach (Ed.), *The international encyclopedia of communication* (XI, pp. 4939–4941). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Stanley, B. (2017). Populism in central and eastern Europe. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, P. Ostiguy, & B. Stanley (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of populism (Vol. 1, pp. 140–158). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Stanyer, J., Salgado, S., & Strömbäck, J. (2017). Populist actors as communicators or political actors as populist communicators: Cross-national findings and perspectives. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. de Vreese (Eds.), *Populist political communication in Europe* (pp. 353–364). New York: Routledge.

Taggart, P. (2000). *Populism. Concepts in the social sciences*. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.

Weiss Yaniv, N., & Tenenboim-Weinblatt, K. (2017). Israel: Right-wing populism and beyond. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, & C. H. de Vreese (Eds.), *Populist political communication in Europe* (pp. 207–220). New York: Routledge.

Wettstein, M., Esser, F., Schulz, A., Wirz, D. S., & Wirth, W. (2018). News media as gatekeepers, critics, and initiators of populist communication: How journalists in ten countries deal with the populist challenge. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, *18*, 1-20. doi: 10.1177/1940161218785979

Wirth, W., Esser, F., Engesser, S., Wirz, D., Schulz, A., Ernst, N., . . . Schemer, C. (2016). *The appeal of populist ideas, strategies and styles: A theoretical model and research design for analyzing populist political communication*. Zürich: NCCR Democracy, Working Paper No. 88, pp. 1–60. Retrieved from http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/pdf/wp88.pdf